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Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of their ability to attract top
talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and
Lublin 2010). However, because a tournament incentive structure explicitly evokes competition,
prior economic literature has shown that the harmful effects of sabotage observed during a
tournament can completely negate any benefits they have (Carpenter et al. 2010). The remedies
suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that contribute to both
beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to date, no remedy for
the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because the ability to
sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an experiment in
which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each other and
receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I first predict that sabotage during a
tournament will be higher than fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a
tournament. I then predict that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of
promise keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still
giving their best effort. In the majority of cases, this allows the company to reap the previously
observed benefits of a tournament incentive, while minimizing the previously observed costs that
normally accompany a tournament incentive. However, I unexpectedly discover that a code of
ethics can be able double-edge sword; In so much that, if violations persist despite certifications
to follow the code, participants may become more discouraged and their behavior more
detrimentally effects productivity than if those same violations occurred without a code. The
implications of employing a code of ethics under these two incentive systems on overall
productivity is explored.
Keywords: sabotage; tournament; code of ethics; social norm activation.

I. INTRODUCTION

A rank-order tournament compensation scheme is one in which the pay, promotion, or
prize depends on an individual’s ordinal rank in the organization rather than his output level
(Lazear and Rosen 1981a). Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of
their ability to attract top talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005;
McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin 2010). Tournaments help reduce the common uncertainty
between employee effort and observable output by comparing employees to their peers, rather
than tying compensation to a discrete measure of output (Lazear and Rosen 1979). This may
reduce the required risk premium demanded by employees, which combined with their higher
effort may lead to greater profits for the firm (Prendergast 1999). However, because the incentive
structure explicitly evokes competition, employees may be reluctant to cooperate and might even
engage in strategic behavior such as sabotage (Lazear 1989; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato
and Nieken 2014), excessive risk taking (Hannan et al. 2008) or other behavior that is
incongruent with firm goals (Charness et al. 2014). For example, members of a sales division
might not only refuse to share leads with or give advice to their colleagues, but also might poach
clients or subvert client relationships while in a tournament. In addition, those who feel that
victory is unattainable may simply become disheartened, “give up” and provide less effort than
they would otherwise (Berger et al. 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014). For this reason,
companies may be reluctant to use tournament incentive programs when they need to motivate a
large group of employees to not only give more effort, but also engage in sharing and
cooperation. This study examines whether a combination of economic incentives and social
norms can motivate employees to give their best effort without resorting to harmful strategic
behavior like sabotage.
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Because only relative performance matters in a tournament, sabotage, rather than fidelity,
may better serve the employee’s interests. This means that under a tournament incentive scheme
overall productivity may suffer because employees are willing to sabotage each other in order to
win the tournament prize (Chen 2003; Münster 2007; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005). This
economic incentive for employees to engage in sabotage under a tournament incentive scheme
may prove so detrimental to an employer’s bottom line that they would have been better off
utilizing a flat wage or piece rate incentive (Carpenter et al. 2010). Researchers in the economics
and management literature have proposed several remedies to reduce sabotage from promotion
based on seniority (Chen 2003) or a reduction in the prize spread (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005)
to gender quotas (Dato and Nieken 2014). Although they may reduce sabotage, previously
proposed solutions may be costly and could reduce the benefits previously observed under a
tournament incentive. I propose a different solution. Instead of adjusting formal controls by
tweaking economic incentives, managers can rely on an informal control. They can utilize social
norms by presenting the employees an opportunity to agree to a code of ethics that specifically
condemns sabotage.
Recent accounting research has illustrated that getting employees to internalize to a code
of ethics may activate social norms that can discourage undesirable behavior. By utilizing
Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation Davidson and Stevens (2013) predict and find
that if managers publicly certify a code of ethics, both manager return behavior and investor
confidence increase. If activating social norms discourages those in a tournament incentive
program from engaging in sabotage while still giving their best effort, it may be possible for
managers to get the “best of both worlds”. In addition, those who would have been discouraged
by sabotage and otherwise given up in a tournament might be encouraged to continue. Using
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Bicchieri’s model in this study allows for relevant and verifiable predictions. Therefore, instead
of simply reporting behavior that departs from traditional economic self-interest, this study helps
us understand what drives such behavior.
Sabotage has been studied in economics and management and has been acknowledged as
a problem in accounting (Bol and Lill 2015), but the ability to engage in such behavior has
largely been controlled in experimental accounting studies. By allowing employees to personally
gain at the expense of one another, I specifically examine a very attractive form of sabotage:
overtly stealing credit from fellow employees. This often takes place in the workplace and can
affect raises and promotion decisions (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012; Dillon 2014). I chose to study this
attractive form of sabotage because any remedy I found would also presumably work on less
attractive, more self-destructive forms of sabotage. I make two theoretical predictions. First,
based on the economic incentives present in a tournament and the results of prior experimental
studies, I predict that sabotage will be higher under a tournament incentive than a flat wage
incentive. Second, if participants first certify a code of ethics that discourages sabotage, I predict
an interaction will occur whereby the decrease in sabotage will be highest under a tournament
incentive. This prediction is based on the expectation that the certification of the code of ethics
activates social norms, such as promise keeping, which lead to a decrease in sabotage. This
decrease will be highest under a tournament because it’s easier to rationalize bad behavior (and
thus evade the norm) under a flat wage compensation because (unlike under a tournament)
sabotage doesn’t lead to economic harm. Finally, I explore interactive effects of incentive type
and code of ethics certification on overall productivity.
I ran an experiment with a 2x2 between-subjects factorial design (with repeated periods).
I manipulated the presence or absence of a code of ethics (that condemns sabotage) and the type
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of incentive compensation used (tournament / flat wage) to examine their effects on individual
employee behavior and overall firm productivity. Groups of three participants engage in a real
effort task entitled Stamp Out!, a task featured in the videogame Mario Party 4 (Nintendo 2002).
Each of the three active participants simultaneously attempts to “paint” as much of single large
canvas as they can in 30 seconds. Each participant controls a “stamp” with a unique color that
begins the round at a different part of the canvas. When the timer starts, all participants can
witness each other’s activity in real-time while a countdown timer is displayed at the top of the
screen. If they choose, participants have the ability to benefit from sabotage by painting over a
section of the canvas that has already been covered with another participant’s unique color. At
the end of a 30 second round, each participant is shown what percentage of the total canvas has
been covered in their unique color. Participants are compensated based on a rank order or a flat
wage. Participants repeat the activity for ten rounds and then answer a post-experimental
questionnaire.
The results of the experiment support my two predictions, that sabotage is more likely to
occur during a tournament and that a code of ethics would lead to the greatest reduction in
sabotage during a tournament. However, I find that employing a code of ethics during a
tournament might not always be best for productivity. Although, in the majority of cases
certifying a code of ethics nearly eliminated sabotage entirely, which led to high productivity, in
the few cases in which sabotage occurred despite a code of ethics the other participants were so
discouraged they appeared to give up entirely.
The study makes several contributions to the accounting literature. First, because I
utilized a real effort task that “involves effort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other
affectations not present” in chosen effort (van Dijk et al. 2001, 189), I was able to capture
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behavior and gain insights that may not have been possible had I followed the traditional method
of using a turn-based effort choice task. I also discovered a relatively low cost way to reduce
sabotage and that was shown to be effective in environments where sabotage was most likely to
occur. In addition, I might be able to shed some light on how the effectiveness of different
compensation schemes (like those presented in Hannan et al (2008) and Tafkov (2013) compare
when given timely relative performance feedback and sabotage is allowed. I also extend prior
literature by further exploring the underlying mechanisms that manage Bicchieri’s model of
social norm activation.
This study also has potential implications for practice by providing management with
insight into how to practically design and implement an incentive system. Although acts of overt
sabotage, like stealing ideas or taking credit for the work of others can happen in even the most
cohesive and familial environments, the game-like nature of the environment used in this study
most closely matches workplace environments that highly prize individual achievement and focus
workplace monitoring on the results rather than the mechanisms of employee behavior. Specific
examples may include that of a Car Sales Consultant who have been described as working in a
“cut-throat environment”, which may contribute to the 72% annual turnover rate (NADA 2015).
The fact that sabotage was affected at all, in an environment where there were such strong
economic and social incentives that encourage unethical behavior toward fellow employees,
speaks to the potential power of this relatively simple remedy. However, this study also sheds light
on the fact that while employing a code of ethics can be an economical and effective tool; I find it
possible that it can also be a double-edged sword if its efficacy is not monitored.

5

In the next section, I give a short review of the relevant literature and develop my
hypothesis. In Section III, I describe my experimental design. In Section IV, I present my results.
In Section V, I conclude.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Tournaments
Lazear and Rosen (1981) present an early formal theoretical model for behavior in rankorder tournaments. In their model, output is observable and input is not. Output is described as a
function of both effort and noise, such that: Output = Effort + Noise. Noise consists of both
common environmental factors and individual idiosyncratic factors that are beyond the control of
the employee. Because employees are assumed to be risk averse, they demand a risk premium
under a piece-rate contract (Lazear and Rosen 1981a). However, under a tournament incentive
scheme where employees are rewarded based on relative rank, the common environmental risk is
shared by all employees. This largely reduces the need for a risk premium because pay would be
independent of these common environmental factors (Hannan et al. 2008). Assuming that there
isn’t a large disparity in skill level among the employees, tournaments are generally regarded as
a suitable means to increase effort and performance (Lazear and Rosen 1981a).
Tournaments are largely observed in practice with prizes ranging from a simple
promotion to large cash bonuses or extravagant vacation packages (Casas-Arce and MartínezJerez 2009; Backes‐Gellner and Pull 2013). Over half of US companies utilize some form of a
tournament incentive scheme, which leads some employees to add value to the firm (McGregor
2006). However, because a tournament incentive explicitly evokes competition, some employees
might engage in counter-productive strategic behavior such as a sabotage (Lazear 1989; Harbring
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and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato and Nieken 2014), excessive risk taking (Hannan et al. 2008) or other
behavior that is incongruent with firm goals (Charness et al. 2014).
Sabotage
In this study, I examine one of the most attractive forms of sabotage: overtly stealing
from fellow employees. This form of sabotage is attractive because the saboteur directly benefits
in absolute terms as well as in relative terms. Overtly stealing credit for a fellow employee’s idea
or past effort can even be used when competition among fellow employees isn’t very salient,
such as when the reward is a simple praise from a superior or increases the possibility of a
promotion (Dillon 2014). Many times this type of sabotage is hard to guard against, especially
during collaborative work where management doesn’t have the will and/or resources to know
who did what (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012). It may also be hard to combat because it could be
engrained in workplace culture such as when union leaders commandeer money-saving
workplace improvements from low-level union members, pass them onto management, and
collect the reward for themselves (Gupta and Singhal 1993).
However, not all forms of sabotage benefit the saboteur, in absolute terms (Crino 1994,
312) defined workplace sabotage as behavior intended to “damage, disrupt, or subvert the
operations for the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating unfavorable publicity,
embarrassment, delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of working
relationships, or the harming of employees or customers”. Other examples of sabotage can range
from gossip and bullying to theft or destruction of files or equipment (Sprouse and IllustratorCox 1992; Jeter and Nursing 2010; Maher 2010). Additionally, motivations behind sabotage can
vary from social injustice to simple economic incentives and can be targeted at either individuals
or the organization itself (Analoui 1995; Ambrose et al. 2002). Workplace sabotage can
7

adversely affect not only the physical and psychological health of one or more individuals, but
also the overall productivity and financial health of the organization as a whole (Jeter and
Nursing 2010). Because of its impact and prevalence in the modern workforce, sabotage is
considered an important subject of examination by researchers in both economics and
management.
Using an economic model, Chen (2003) illustrated that employees in competition for
promotion (a type of rank-order tournament) would generally focus their sabotage on the
member with the greatest ability. As an old Japanese proverb says, “the nail that sticks out gets
hammered” (Okada 1955, 28). This not only leads to productive inefficiencies, but also decreases
the chance that the most competent employees get promoted (Chen 2003). This phenomenon has
since been observed in subsequent experimental studies (Münster 2007; Carpenter et al. 2010).
In fact, when sabotage was allowed within a tournament incentive scheme, the advantages
previously observed over a piece rate scheme were lost (Carpenter et al. 2010).
Prior economic research has also shown that certain factors can moderate the amount of
sabotage in a tournament. A handful of experiments have found that sabotage increases as the
prize spread in the tournament increases and serve as a reminder of the power of traditional
explicit economic incentives (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008;
Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011). Researchers have also observed this phenomenon in practice. del
Corral et al. (2010) observed that an increase in the points awarded for a victory in fútbol
tournament play affected the incidence of fouls, penalty cards, and the number of defensive
players on the roster (del Corral et al. 2010). However, a more recent study highlights that
implicit nonmonetary factors can also motivate individuals to engage in sabotage (Charness et al.
2014). Charness et al. (2014) placed participants into groups of three and gave them a flat wage
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to work on a decoding task. Simply providing relative performance information motivated the
participants to invest in costly sabotage in order to improve their relative position in the group.
The results of their study suggest that economic incentives are not necessary to persuade
individuals to engage in sabotage. The status achieved through simple social comparison would
be enough to motivate the participants to engage in sabotage, even if the task doesn’t require any
particular skill or talent.
Another set of studies imply that companies may not need to add any economic or social
incentives in order to encourage sabotage (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009; Abbink and Herrmann
2011). In these studies, two players are endowed with an equal amount of money and
simultaneously decide whether or not to “destroy” the other player's payoff for a price. The
authors manipulate whether or not there is a one in three chance that an “act of nature” would
destroy their opponent’s money anyway. The authors find the destruction rates rise significantly
during the aforementioned treatment1, despite the fact that no strategic reason exists for such a
decision. This implies that some individuals simply take pleasure in destruction.
Even though employees may not need an overt economic incentive to engage in sabotage,
it certainly does not hurt. Prior literature shows that workers compensated under a tournament
incentive scheme are more likely to engage in sabotage than those under piece rate compensation
(Carpenter et al. 2010). This is because those in a rank order tournament benefit the most
economically from sabotage. Those being paid a flat wage receive no economic benefit at all
from sabotage.

1

If we view the results of this study in light of Bicchieri’s (2006) model, the results seem to suggest that the
participants were able to evade any social norms that would discourage destruction by hiding behind uncertainty
not unlike the participants in Abdel-Rahim and Stevens (2015)
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Based on prior literature, simply having relative performance information provides
enough social incentives to engage in sabotage regardless of whether employees are
compensated via a tournament or flat wage. However, only tournament compensation provides a
clear economic incentive to engage in sabotage. Therefore I expect that employees will engage in
more sabotage when compensated under a tournament incentive system than given a flat wage.
H1: Employees will engage in more sabotage when compensated under a
tournament incentive system than given a flat wage
Because of the harm that sabotage can have on productivity, researchers have suggested a
variety of countermeasures. Some have proposed implementing a system that can identify and
sanction such behavior (Balafoutas et al. 2012). Others have suggested reducing the economic
incentives either by promoting based solely on seniority or instituting pay equality rather than
tournament prizes (Chen 2003; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008). Other proposals include gender
quotas during promotion because of the disproportionate likelihood that males will engage in
sabotage (Dato and Nieken 2014). In addition, others have proposed reducing the sting sabotage
might have on productivity by eliminating relative performance information, which reduces the
chance that others in the group will combine their efforts to sabotage the highest performer
(Gürtler et al. 2013). It’s worth noting that each of the previously proposed solutions is
admittedly not without its drawbacks. Some would be either costly to implement (Balafoutas et
al. 2012) or may reduce the positive effects tournaments may offer (Harbring and Irlenbusch
2008). For example, public relative performance information has been shown to have a positive
effect on individuals under certain types of performance-based contracts (Tafkov 2013; Newman
and Tafkov 2014). I propose a different solution. Managers can utilize social norms by
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presenting the employees an opportunity to agree to a code of ethics that specifically condemns
sabotage.
Code of Ethics
Langlois and Schlegelmilch (1990 p. 522) define a corporate code of ethics as ‘‘a
statement setting down corporate principles, ethics, rules of conduct, codes of practice or
company philosophy concerning responsibility to employees, shareholders, consumers, the
environment, or any other aspects of society external to the company.’’ Although a heightened
research interest has followed the increased prevalence of corporate codes, most of the research
has focused on the content of these codes rather than their effect on behavior (Benson 1989;
Jamal and Bowie 1995; Stajkovic and Luthans 1997; Svensson et al. 2009; Bodolica and
Spraggon 2015; Komic et al. 2015). Furthermore, those studies that focus on the effectiveness of
a code of ethics seem to yield mixed results. Some researchers have found that organizations that
utilize a code of ethics report a lower incidence of misconduct and rate their companies as more
ethical (Pierce and Henry 1996; Schwartz 2001; Somers 2001; KPMG 2008). While other studies
conclude that a code of ethics doesn’t positively affect behavior and is simply a way to protect
the company from legal liability (Stevens 1994; Cleek and Leonard 1998; McKendall et al. 2002;
Helin and Sandstrom 2007). In a review of research that examines the effectiveness of a code of
ethics in corporations, Kaptein and Schwartz (2008) attribute the mixed results to a lack of
theory, deficiencies in research methodologies and an inconsistent definition of a code of ethics.
Watruba, Chonko, and Loe (2001) illustrate three major reasons why a company should
adopt a code of ethics: (1) to show that they value ethical behavior; (2) to relay their ethical
values to the members of their organization; and (3) to impact employee behavior (Wotruba et al.
2001). Over the last thirty years, there has been a sharp rise in the number of companies that
11

have instituted a code of ethics/conduct within their organization (KPMG 2008). Ironically, the
rise doesn’t seem to be attributed to a crisis of conscious. According to KMPG, 85% of the
Global 200 companies polled gave “compliance with legal requirements” as the primary reason
for having a code of ethics. Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) requires
organizations to disclose the adoption of a corporate code of ethics or justify the absence of such
a code. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ now require all listed firms to
adopt and disclose their corporate code of ethics. The motivation behind why an organization
implements a code of ethics may be a major contributor to how effective it is. If employees
perceive that a code of ethics merely exists to fulfill a legal requirement, then they may be less
likely to (1) perceive that they company values ethical conduct; (2) know what the company
values; and (3) develop expectations that influence their behavior.
More recently, other researchers have attempted to identify the specific determinants that
make a corporate code of ethics successful after observing that the mere existence of a code of
ethics may not be enough to affect behavior (Wotruba et al. 2001; Kaptein and Schwartz 2008;
Singh 2011). Wotruba et al. (2001) surveyed nearly three hundred executives that were members
of the Direct Selling Association. They found that effectiveness of the code of ethics was
associated with familiarity and usefulness. Singh (2011) surveyed the CEOs of over one hundred
of Canada’s top 500 companies. He found that the effectiveness of the code of ethics was
associated with its communication and perceived enforcement within the organization. Davidson
and Stevens (2013) captured these two attributes by having participants “certify” the code of
ethics. They utilized an investment game and found that a code of ethics improved manager
return behavior and investor confidence only to the extent that it activated social norms that
control opportunistic behavior. It wasn’t until managers “certified” the code of ethics that these
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benefits were achieved. Further analysis revealed that the underlying mechanism driving their
results was the activation of the social norm of promise keeping as predicted by Bicchieri’s
(2006) model of social norm activation (Davidson and Stevens 2013). As I explain below, social
norm theory can also be used to predict the results of both Wotruba et al. (2001) and Singh
(2011).
Social Norm Theory
As summarized in Blay et al. (2015) the roots of social norm theory can be traced back to
Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) influential work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith asserted
that mankind is gifted with a natural reverence for the general rules of conduct. This natural
respect for social norms can be observed in the substantial role that norms and laws play in
sustaining order throughout society (Smith 1759/1790; Blay et al. 2015). Bicchieri’s (2006)
model of social norm activation explains how people interpret the motives and expectations of
others. Consistent with Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) moral theory, the model suggests that social
norm activation relies on situational cues and information that shape beliefs and expectations.
According to the Bicchieri model, first, there is a contingency condition. This condition is
essential to the activation of a social norm. The contingency condition asserts that individuals are
aware that a behavioral rule R exists and applies to situations of type S. In other words, everyone
has to know about the behavioral rule and its relevance to the current situation. Next, the
Bicchieri model describes the empirical expectations condition. This is a belief that an
adequately large subset of the population P conforms to the behavioral rule R in situations of
type S. These expectations are often based on observed behavior in similar situations and can be
strengthened or weakened by the ensuing observed behavior. Finally, the Bicchieri model
describes two normative expectations conditions. The first normative condition states that
13

individuals believe an adequately large subset of P expects them to conform to R in situations of
type S. What makes the situation normative is that individual’s perception of what other people
believe that an individual has an obligation to confirm to R in the appropriate circumstances. The
belief that others’ normative expectations are reasonable or legitimate can be sufficient to
motivate behavior consistent with a social norm. The second normative condition adds the belief
that others may be willing to sanction the individual’s behavior when they can observe it. This
possibility of sanctions may be necessary for some individuals to follow a social norm. Bicchieri
(2006, 45) also asserts that social norms are complex, and “several norms may apply to the same
situation, or it may not be clear which norms have a bearing in a given case.’’ Simply publically
agreeing to act “ethically” (as is the case in my study) may activate any number of social norms
including fairness, reciprocity, and trustworthiness (in addition to the social norm of promisekeeping) (Bicchieri 2006).
In summary, her model suggests that a social norm is activated when a person is made
aware of a behavioral rule that is relevant to the current situation (the contingency stage). That
person will then follow that rule if he believes that there are both empirical and normative
expectations that give him a sufficient reason to follow the behavioral rule. Bicchieri’s model
predicts the results of the surveys reported in both the Wotruba et al. (2001) and Singh (2011)
studies. In their respective studies, communication and familiarity are both indicators that the
employees will reach Bicchieri’s contingency stage. Likewise, usefulness and enforcement are
both indicators that the company has provided both empirical and normative expectations which
lead to compliance with the norm within the organization. Bicchieri’s model also empowers
experimental researchers to develop testable hypotheses related to contextual factors on moral
reasoning and behavior. For example, the effectiveness of a contextual factor (such as requiring
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certification of a code of ethics) is based on its ability to alter empirical and normative
expectations for a given norm. I believe that by having every employee agree to sign a code of
ethics, a company can provide both empirical and normative expectations that will lead the
employee to keep their promise and adhere to the code (Bicchieri 2006; Davidson and Stevens
2013).
The Interaction of Economic Incentives and Social Norms
Initially, because none of the participants have been able to observe each other’s
behavior, a normative expectation (rather than an empirical expectation) would likely have the
most influence over their behavior. In the presence of a certified code of ethics, a strong
normative expectation is established (Davidson and Stevens 2013). In this study, the code of
ethics is designed to discourage sabotage and encourage fidelity. As a result, I would expect the
participants who certify a code of ethics to initially abstain from engaging in sabotage. In
addition, immediately after the task begins, participants will start to develop an empirical
expectation based on what they observe. Therefore, their initial observed fidelity should be
reinforced by the subsequent observation of ethical behavior.
I expect that, absent a code of ethics, employees under tournament compensation would
engage in more sabotage than employees given a flat wage (see H1). Therefore, if I expect a
code of ethics can reduce sabotage at all, I would expect it to have a greater effect on those under
a tournament incentive than those given a flat wage simply because those under tournament
compensation have more room to improve. However, it is possible that because a code of ethics
primes the employee to think of the possible harm (s)he could cause to others (rather than
thinking solely about their own benefit), that those in a tournament might sabotage less than
those given a flat wage (Tsang 2002). This is because sabotage during a tournament causes both
15

social and economic harm to others, while sabotage under flat wage compensation does not
cause any economic harm to others. Therefore, even though that a code of ethics primes
employees to think of others regardless of condition, it is easier to rationalize bad behavior under
a flat wage compensation because (unlike under a tournament) there is no economic harm. In any
case, I predict that having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger effect on sabotage
for those under tournament based compensation than those under piece rate or flat wage
compensation.
H2: Having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger mitigating effect on
sabotage for those under tournament based compensation than those flat wage
compensation.
Effects on Overall Productivity
Overall Group Productivity can be simply defined as Group Effort – Group Effort
Wasted due to Sabotage. Like sabotage, Group Effort can be influenced by both economic and
social factors. Although the flat wage condition may lack an economic incentive to give effort,
participants are given relative performance feedback in that they will be able to view each
other’s actions in real-time with a single winner being declared for each round. In the presence of
relative performance information, even without economic incentives, individuals can be
motivated to exert effort simply because they take joy in outperforming others. Evidence of
simple social comparison motivating effort has appeared in psychology, economic and
accounting literatures (Suls and Wills 1991; Hannan et al. 2008; Dohmen et al. 2011; Tafkov
2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014) and has even lead famous children’s author C.S. Lewis to
write:
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We say that people are proud of being rich, or clever, or good-looking, but they are not.
They are proud of being richer, or cleverer, or better-looking than others. If everyone else
became equally rich, or clever, or good-looking there would be nothing to be proud
about. It is the comparison that makes you proud: the pleasure of being above the rest.
Once the element of competition has gone, pride has gone (Lewis 1952, 81).
Therefore, I expect all participants, even those in the flat wage conditions, to put forth significant
effort. By the same token, although tournaments provide employees a positive economic
incentive to put forth more effort in order to outperform their colleagues, repeated tournaments
can also be accompanied by negative social factors such as complacency by the winners and
dejection by the losers (Berger et al. 2013). Therefore, because tournaments have been associated
with both an increase in effort due to economic incentives and a decrease in effort due to
discouragement, it is difficult to predict the effect of the economic incentive on group effort.
This makes it difficult to predict the interactive effects on overall productivity. Likewise, it is
difficult to predict the effects of a code of ethics on effort. Unlike sabotage, effort might not have
much room for improvement.
However, if tournaments are accompanied by an increase in sabotage (as I predict in H1)
then the effect of tournaments on Group Loss due to Sabotage (and therefore group productivity)
is quite clear. The increase in sabotage that I predict will accompany a tournament incentive can
lead to Group Loss in two ways, through discouragement and/or redundancy. In repeated
periods, sabotage can be demoralizing and may lead to employees exerting less effort than they
would otherwise. Sabotage also directly leads to Group Loss because of the redundancy of effort.
For example, one member of a sales division might put forth a significant amount of effort in
order to win over a client only to have another member of sales division go after the same client
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(rather than someone else) in an effort to steal his sale. In this case, had both members gone after
separate clients, the company might have had twice as many sales with the same amount of
collective effort. The effect of a code of ethics on Group Loss is discernable. Prior literature
leads me to believe, that when workers certify a code of ethics that condemns sabotage, the
activation of the social norm of promise keeping will discourage sabotage (Davidson and
Stevens 2013).
Because Group Productivity is the difference between Group Effort and Group Loss and
the effects of incentive compensation and a code of ethics on Group Effort is unclear, I pose the
following research question in order to explore the effects these two factors have on overall
productivity.
RQ1: How will having employees certify a code of ethics affect the productivity of those
under tournament based compensation versus those under a flat wage compensation?
III. METHODOLOGY
Experimental Task
The participants are given instructions that explain that they had been hired by “Painter
Corp” to paint a series of canvases. They are told that the goal of Painter Corp is to have as much
of each canvas painted as possible. The computerized task is a modified version of a single minigame featured in the videogame Mario Party 4 (Nintendo 2002). In the mini-game, entitled
Stamp Out!, four2 players, each sitting on top of a uniquely colored machine that resembles a

2

During the experimental task, only three players are active. The fourth is an inactive host player who is controlled
by the experimenter. This is detailed later on in the paper.
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pogo stick atop a stamp pad3, simultaneously try to “paint” as much of a large single white
canvas as they can in 30 seconds. All the participants witness each other’s activity in real-time
while a count-down timer is displayed at the top of the screen. At the end of a 30 second round,
each player is shown what percentage of the total canvas has been covered in their unique color.
Players control their stamp pad by manipulating five keys on their computer keyboard, namely
the four directional arrow keys and “X” key4. Every time a player stamps the canvas, the spot on
the canvas where the player has stamped is painted with their unique color. Therefore, it is
possible that any one player can stamp over an area that was previously painted by another
player. Stamping over a spot where another player has previously painted increased the amount
of canvas that they are credited with painting while simultaneously decreasing the amount of
canvas the other player is credited with painting. However, the canvas is large enough that each
of the three active players has the opportunity to paint as much of the canvas as they are capable
of without needing to paint over a colleague5. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1.

3

The participants control a character that is sitting on top of a large rubber stamp filled with ink. Each time the
participant presses the “X” key, the character (while sitting on top of the stamp) can “hop” a certain distance along
the white canvas thereby creating a new ink spot with the rubber stamp. The distance the character hops depends
on the amount of time the participant holds down the “A” key. Each additional hop requires and additional
pressing of the “X” key. See Figure 1 for screenshots of the gameplay.
4

The real effort task of attempting to paint as much of the canvas as possible by hopping on a rubber stamp
captures all four components of the effort construct mentioned in (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002): direction, duration,
intensity, and strategy development. (1) Direction: The employee may direct their avatar in any direction they
choose (2) Duration: The employee may choose how long they want to engage in the activity (and they are also
compensated for inactivity) (3) Intensity: it takes focus to precisely time the key strokes in order to quickly cover
the most ground. Mindlessly mashing the “A” will not result in the fastest movement. (4) Strategy: navigating the
field of play and deciding if/when to engage in sabotage.
5

In pre-trial testing, the maximum amount a very skilled player could paint in 30 seconds was 25% of the canvas.
Similarly, during the experiment, the maximum amount that any participant could paint in 30 seconds was 25% of
the canvas (two participants achieved this feat). The maximum amount that any group of participants could paint
was 64% of the canvas.
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Figure 1
Part A:
Screenshots of the Incentivized Task (with Sabotage)

The participants start in the position seen above.

.

In the example above, all three active avatars
can be seen actively engaging in sabotage

A total of 32% of the canvas was painted by the participants. The red avatar (Mario) was
controlled by the host computer and was inactive throughout the experiment.

20

Figure 1 (continued)
Part B:
Screenshots of the Incentivized Task (without Sabotage)

The participants start in the position seen above.

.

In the example above, all three active avatars
do not wish to engage in sabotage

A total of 55% of the canvas was painted by the participants. As always, the red avatar (Mario)
was controlled by the host computer and was inactive throughout the experiment.
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The task was performed in an experimental lab that contained a series of networked
computers inside private cubicles. Although, the software was originally designed to support four
networked players simultaneously performing the computerized task, participants were instead
arranged into groups of three and assigned to computers that were networked into a fourth “host
player”. The fourth inactive host player was controlled by the experimenter. This allowed the
experimenter to completely control the flow of the task, simultaneously monitor all activity, and
better analyze the experiment.
All participants remain completely anonymous to each other, so that any behavior
exhibited during the experiment is not influenced by prior relationships or fear of postexperimental reprisals. Each participant is separated from each other by cubicle dividers and
avatars are positioned in an irregular arrangement. Additionally, in a post-experimental
questionnaire, each participant was asked the following two questions:
Did you, at any time, know the true identity of anyone else’s avatar?
YES

NO,

If yes, please explain how:

Did anyone else, at any time, know the true identity of your avatar?
YES

NO,

If yes, please explain how:

For each question, 177 out of 180 participants indicated that they and everyone else were
completely anonymous6.
Participants were assigned an avatar and groups of three by utilizing covariate adaptive
randomization7 (Fleiss et al. 2003). Because prior research has associated gender with sabotage,

6

The participants that indicated otherwise said they could hear “sighs” or sounds of excitement coming from
another participant at the end of each match. Removing these data does not significantly affect the conclusions in
this study.
7
Because my sample size was relatively small, I had to make sure that any anticipated covariates (such as gender)
were evenly balanced across conditions. I used random assignment unless this resulted in group that was
composed of all one gender. If that happened, I randomly switched two participants between groups until each
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groups were initially randomly assigned, but rearranged if a group contained only one gender.
This was done in order to balance a potential covariate across conditions (Suresh 2011).
Although, the three active participants are asymmetrically arranged on the board, a postexperimental analysis of the task revealed that the initial starting position of the participant was
not a significant predictor of sabotage (p = 0.554, two-tailed).
After the instructions were given, the participants complete a short quiz that ensures they
understand the instructions, including their economic incentives, the goal of painter crop, and how
sabotage effected overall productivity. The participants are then told that, before officially starting
the job, they would have to complete Painter Corp’s training program. Each participant was given
five training rounds. During training, they were told to “try their best” and were allowed to request
personal help during this period. The training rounds were completed and recorded on a duplicate
program that was pre-set for solo play (in which all other avatars are inactive). After five rounds
of practice, they are switched over to the main program that is pre-set for networked play.
Next, the participants begin the recorded experimental group task for at least 10 rounds. At
the end of the tenth round, a coin is flipped in order to determine if the experiment will include an
additional round. This process is continued until the result of the coin flip determines that the
experiment is over. The method that determines the number of total rounds played is explained
during the initial instructions and is used in order to prevent “end game effects” (Schatzberg and
Stevens 2008; Douthit et al. 2012).
After the final round of the experiment is over, the participants answer a postexperimental questionnaire, are paid anonymously in cash, and leave.

group had at least one of each gender. This method has an advantage over stratified randomization, in that it can
balance the covariates even when the sample size is relatively small (Hu et al. 2014)
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Independent Variables
In my experiment, I controlled both the presence and absence of a code of ethics and the
type of incentive compensation scheme (tournament / flat wage) utilized. The task was described
along with how they will be compensated. In the “code” condition, after the practice period,
immediately before the recorded task begins, the employees were presented with a single sheet
of paper with the company’s code of ethics:
As an employee, hired by the company, I am expected to adhere to the following:


I will act in good faith with the intention to add value to the company through hard work
and ethical conduct.



I will act responsibly and ethically with regard to my fellow employees and will not seek
personal gain at their expense.

This code of ethics is an adapted and simplified version of what would typically be seen in the
workplace8. Consistent with Pragmatic Theory of Language, by limiting the content in the code
of ethics I help ensure message delivery and highlight its importance (Huang 2007; Bloomfield
2012). The participants were then required to certify this code of ethics by signing and dating the
bottom of the page.
How the participants were to be economically incentivized was outlined in the
experimental instructions and varied according to the experimental condition. The participants
were paid in an experimental currency, Lira, denoted by the “£” symbol. Under a flat wage
incentive scheme, each participant was paid £200 per 30 second round regardless of production.
Under the tournament incentive scheme, whoever has the highest percentage of the canvas

8

The code of ethics was taken from the Manufacturers’ Agents National Association (MANA) and adapted and
simplified for the experimental procedure. See Appendix A.
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painted at the end of each 30 second round were paid £400. The other two participants were paid
£100. In case of a tie, the two winners received £250 with the remaining participant receiving
£100. In case of a three-way tie, all three participants would receive £200.
In addition, because the real effort task may resemble how some participants may spend
their real life leisure time (playing a video game), the participants were also compensated for
their inactivity during the task in order to better distinguish between effort and leisure. In all
conditions, participants were told that they would be compensated £2 for every second of
inactivity in a 30 second round (which could result in a maximum £60 bonus). This method of
ensuring that effort is costly follows the lead of similar methods utilized in experimental
accounting research (Sprinkle 2000; Hecht et al. 2012; Newman and Tafkov 2014). The
instructions ended by telling participants that at the end of the experiment, a random round
would be selected and the payoff for that round will be converted from Lira into Dollars at the
predetermined exchange rate, so they should treat each round as the payoff round.
Dependent Variables
The task was video recorded on each group’s “host” computer. Individual sabotage
occurred when one employee painted over a portion of the canvas that had already been painted
by another employee. Each video was carefully analyzed in order to correctly record the amount
of sabotage that had been done by each avatar. The correlation between the two sabotage coders
was 0.953 with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.973, which exceeds typical reliability thresholds (Field
2013)9. Group Sabotage was calculated by recording the sum of all the individual sabotage that

9

Such a high number isn’t surprising considering that the coders that were rating sabotage were essentially
engaging in slow, careful, counting rather than trying give a subjective assessment. See Appendix B for an excerpt
from the sabotage coding instructions.
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occurred within the group during a 30 second round. Individual Redundancy Loss occurred when
one employee was sabotaged by another employee. Group Redundancy Loss was calculated by
recording the sum of all the individual redundancy loss that occurred within the group during a
30 second round. Because the canvas is a closed system, by definition Group Sabotage = Group
Redundancy Loss. In other words, whenever one employee sabotaged another, an equal amount
of sabotage and loss occurred within the group. Individual productivity was recorded as the
percentage of the canvas that had been painted by the avatar’s unique color at the end of the 30
second round. At the end of each round the computer program displayed the percentage of the
canvas that was covered by each avatar and declared a winner. Group Productivity was
calculated by recording the total percentage of the canvas that was covered by the three
employees10. Individual Effort11 was represented by the amount of canvas an employee would
have been credited with painting (Individual Productivity) if redundancy loss due to sabotage
from another employee had not occurred. Thus Individual Effort = Individual Productivity +
Individual Redundancy Loss. Likewise Group Effort = Group Productivity + Group Redundancy
Loss. Group Effort could also be calculated by recording the sum of all Individual Effort within
the group. Individual Effort Withheld12 was recorded as the individual’s highest effort recorded

10

Although there were four avatars on the screen, the red avatar (Mario) was controlled by the host computer and
was inactive throughout the experiment.
11

Although keystrokes were recorded, they do not serve as a good proxy for effort because they only represent
one reliable measured attribute of effort (duration). While the act of painting as much of the canvas as possible
incorporates all four attributes of effort: direction, duration, intensity, and strategy development (Bonner and
Sprinkle 2002).
12

I am confident that individual learning did not confound this measure for two reasons (1) Only 6% of the
recorded rounds have an avatar giving more effort than that of their highest recorded training round. (2) The
round the participants were in was not a significant predictor of Individual Effort (p = 0.849, two-tailed).
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during the training rounds minus the individual effort recorded for that period. Group Effort
Withheld was calculated as the sum of all the Individual Effort Withheld within the group.

IV. RESULTS
Participants
A total of 180 student participants from a large southeastern university engaged in the
experiment. Participants included 76 males and 104 females whose age ranged from 18 to 62
years old, with an average age of 22.7 years. The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes
for which participants received an average of $9.8813.
Test of H1
H1 predicted that, absent a code of ethics, employees will engage in more sabotage when
compensated under a tournament incentive system than given a flat wage. Panel A of Table 1
gives the descriptive statistics of Group Effort Wasted due to Sabotage. My test results, shown in
Panel B of Table 1, illustrated that those employed under a tournament incentive system engaged
in more sabotage (26.37%) than those given a flat wage (20.24%) (p<0.01, one-tailed) which
supports H1.

13

The participants were informed that they could leave the experiment at any time and still receive a “show-up”
fee of $5.
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Table 1
Panel A:

Panel B:
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Figure 2 presents a graph that shows the average amount of Group Redundancy Loss due
to Sabotage that occurred each round under each treatment group.

Figure 2
Mean Group Sabotage per Round

Test of H2
I directly test the participants normative and empirical expectation (via a postexperimental questionnaire) in order to both reaffirm the findings and illuminate the theoretical
mechanism of Bicchieri’s model (2006). In other words, in order to affirm that a code of ethics
led to a change in behavior because of social norm activation, it is necessary to measure the
mechanism by which a social norm is activated (the normative and empirical expectations of the
participants). In a post-experimental questionnaire, the participants were asked to respond to a
29

series of statements by utilizing a seven-point a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Their response to the following statement tested their empirical expectations:

Before I started the task, I expected that the other employees would not paint over an area
of the canvas that I had already painted.

Their response to the following statement tested their normative expectations:

Before the task began, the other employees expected me not to paint over an area of the
canvas that they had already painted.

Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the responses to the questions testing the empirical and
normative expectations respectively. Participants who certified a code of ethics, regardless of the
incentive compensation type present, responded with an average Likert score that was
significantly higher than 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed) to both questions. On the other hand, the
responses of those who had not certified a code of ethics, regardless of incentive compensation
type present, were not significantly different than the middle Likert response of 4. This shows
that certifying a code of ethics leads to a significant measurable change in both empirical and
normative expectations, which should lead to a change in behavior according to Bicchieri’s
model (2006).
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for PEQ measure of empirical and normative
expectations (the process by which a social norm is activated)

H2 predicted that having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger effect on
sabotage for those under tournament based compensation than those under piece rate or flat wage
compensation. One of the reasons a code of ethics could also have less of an effect on sabotage
when employees are given a flat wage is because it’s easier to rationalize bad behavior (evade
the norm) when there are no financial consequences (Tsang 2002).
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I first estimate a repeated measures ANCOVA in Panel A of Table 3 for which the dependent
variable is Individual Sabotage and which analyzes Code / No Code and Tournament / Flat Wage
between subjects and Round within subjects while controlling for the individual effects of the
participants’ gender, avatar/position, and measured risk preferences14. Because gender is the only

14

Risk preferences were measured using an simplified form of a lottery choice task in which the participants could
choose between a 50% chance of receiving $2 or 100% chance of receiving $1 (Holt and Laury 2002; Hales et al.
2014)
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significant covariate in Panel A, I retain it as a covariate in Panel B15 of Table 3 in which I
estimate a repeated measures ANCOVA for which the dependent variable is Group Redundancy
Loss due to Sabotage and which tests the same between and within subjects factors as Panel A.

As predicted by H2, I find a significant Code / No Code x Tournament / Flat Wage interaction (F
= 7.69, p < 0.01). Figure 3 illustrates the disordinal interaction.

15

In Panel B, Gender, measured as the number of males in the group is not a significant covariate of Group
Redundancy Loss. This indicates that my use of covariate adaptive randomization successfully mitigated the effects
of gender as a potential covariate on Group Activity.
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Test of RQ1
RQ1 aims to explore the effects of the incentive scheme and the certification of a
code of ethics on overall productivity. In other words, which combination would result in the
highest level of productivity? Recall that Productivity is the result of both Effort and Sabotage.
In addition, because Sabotage cannot only hinder current productivity, but also discourage future
effort, Group Effort Withheld was measured in an attempt to capture discouragement. Panel A of
Table 4 the descriptive statistics of Group Productivity.
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Flat Wage*Code and Tournament*Code were the two conditions with the highest level of
average Group Productivity (with 48.72% and 49.63% of the canvas covered respectively). The
difference between these two conditions is not significant (p = 0.323, two-tailed) and these two
conditions are higher than both the Flat Wage * No Code (p < 0.01, two-tailed) and the
Tournament * No Code condition (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Curiously, those in the Tournament *
Code condition reported the highest variance for Effort, and Effort Withheld.
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In Panel B of Table 4, I estimated a repeated measures ANCOVA for which the
dependent variable is Group Productivity and which analyzes Code / No Code and Tournament /
Flat Wage between subjects and Round within subjects while controlling for Gender. The
certification of a code of ethics has a significant main effect (p <0.01 two-tailed); However, there
is also a significant interaction between Code of Ethics Certification and Compensation Incentive
used (p <0.01, two-tailed). Figure 4 illustrates this interaction.
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After further investigation, I discovered that the high variances in Effort, and Effort Withheld
reported in the Tournament * Code condition could be explained by how strongly that group
became discouraged as a result of sabotage.
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Panel A of Tables 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the response to the post-experimental
question designed to capture discouragement. The participants were asked to respond to the
following question by utilizing a seven-point a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree).
The behavior of others discouraged me from trying my best
Despite the fact that those in the Tournament * Code condition experienced the least amount of
sabotage, their response to that post experiment question , 4.71 (p = 0.013), indicates they were
the only condition that felt any level of discouragement as a result of sabotage. Their behavior
also indicates discouragement.
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Panel B of Table 5 displays the number of rounds an individual participant exhibited a particular
level of effort by condition. I assign the highest level of effort given during the individual
training rounds (in which they were told to “try their best”, as the participant’s maximum effort. I
then divided their individual effort during the test rounds by this maximum in order to see if they
were giving their best effort throughout the experiment. Panel B of Table 5 shows that there 25
individual occurrences in the Tournament * Code condition where the participants gave less than
50% of the potential maximum effort. In those instances, it could be said that they simply “gave
up”. Compare this to the 4, 6, and 9 times this occurred in the other conditions. There were 12
occurrences were participants gave less than 10% of their maximum effort in the Tournament *
No Code condition compared to 5 occurrences in the Tournament No Code condition and 0
occurrences in the other two conditions. Simply put, those participants who had experienced
sabotage after certifying a code of ethics under tournament compensation were more likely to be
so uniquely discouraged that, unlike those in the other conditions, they subsequently exerted
little to no effort and dragged down the mean Group Effort and Group Productivity for the rest of
those in the same experimental condition.
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Other Social Norms Activated
I assert that any change in behavior caused by the certification of a code of ethics would
happen because the social norm of promise keeping would be activated as predicted by Bicchieri’s
model (2006) of social norm activation. However, simply publically agreeing to act “ethically” (as
is the case in my study) may activate any number of other social norms including fairness,
reciprocity, and trustworthiness. In my post-experimental questionnaire, I attempt to find out what
other social norms are activated when my participants certified a code of ethics.
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Promise Keeping. On Panel A of Table 6, I first measure the social norm activation of promise
keeping the by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a
Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree):
My behavior was based on my desire to keep my promise
As expected, those participants who certified a code of ethics gave an average response of 5.15
which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). By contrast, those
who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.07, which was not
significantly different than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.718, two-tailed). Thus indicating that
certifying a code of ethics specifically led to a promise keeping norm activation.
Fairness. I next measure the activation of the social norm of fairness by asking
participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree):
My behavior was based on my desire to be fair
Again, the participants who certified a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.90, which is
significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). Those under the tournament
condition, who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 3.22, which was
significantly lower than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.013, two-tailed). Thus indicating that a
desire to be fair did not affect their behavior. While, those in the Flat Wage * No Code condition
gave an average response of 3.93, which was not significantly different than 4 (p = 0.805, twotailed).
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Reciprocity. Panel B of Table 6 shows the results of reciprocity norm activation, which I
measure by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree):
My behavior was based on my desire to reciprocate the behavior of others
This time, the participants who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.63
which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). This is not
surprising, given the amount of sabotage that took place under those conditions and how
instinctual and ubiquitous the norm of revenge / negative reciprocity is (Lillie and Strelan 2016).
Those under the flat wage * code condition, gave an average response of 4.29, which was not
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significantly different than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.341, two-tailed). While those in the
Tournament * Code condition gave an average response of 4.84, which was significantly higher
than 4 (p = 0.805, two-tailed). Given the low amount of sabotage present in that condition, this
might indicate that their behavior was influenced by a desire to exhibit positive reciprocity.
Trustworthiness. Finally, I measure the activation of the social norm of trustworthiness
by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert scale of
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree):
My behavior was based on my desire to be trustworthy.
The responses mirror that of the fairness norm. The participants who certified a code of ethics
gave an average response of 4.91, which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4
(p<0.01, two-tailed). Those in the Tournament * No Code condition, gave an average response of
3.13, which was significantly lower than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.013, two-tailed). Thus
indicating that a desire to be trustworthy did not affect their behavior. While, those in the Flat
Wage * No Code condition gave an average response of 4.07, which was not significantly
different than 4 (p = 0.795, two-tailed).
As Bicchieri’s (2006) model allows for, my code of ethics appeared to have, indeed,
activated several social norms, namely, promise keeping, fairness, and trustworthiness.
Conversely, the social norm of reciprocity did not appear to need code of ethics certification to
be activated.

V. CONCLUSION
I study the effectiveness of a code of ethics on sabotage, effort, and productivity under
two different incentive systems, namely fixed wage and tournament. Tournaments are often used
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because of their ability to attract top talent, reduce environmental risk, and motivate employees
to give their best effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981b; Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin
2010). However, because the incentive structure explicitly evokes competition, employees may
be reluctant to cooperate and might even engage in strategic behavior such as sabotage (Lazear
1989; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato and Nieken 2014).
The remedies suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that
contribute to both beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to
date, no remedy for the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because
the ability to sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an
experiment in which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each
other and receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I examine a very attractive form of
sabotage: overtly stealing credit from fellow employees. This often talks place in the workplace
and can effect raises and promotion decisions (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012; Dillon 2014). I chose to
study this attractive form of sabotage because any remedy I found would also presumably work
on less attractive, forms of sabotage, such as costly destruction. I manipulated the presence or
absence of a code of ethics (that condemns sabotage) and the type of incentive compensation
used (tournament / flat wage) in order to examine their effects on individual employee behavior
and overall firm productivity. I first predict that sabotage during a tournament will be higher than
fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a tournament. I employ Bicchieri’s
(2006) model of social norm activation to make applicable predictions that advance theory
related to harmful behavior such as sabotage and ways to control such behavior in the firm. I
predict and find that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of promise
keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still giving
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their best effort. However, I discover this might not work in all cases. In a minority of cases, I
discover that if in which sabotage persists under a tournament in spite of a code of ethics,
participants become more discouraged than they would otherwise.
I propose to extend the literature by demonstrating a way to reduce the negative effects of
sabotage under tournament based compensation. In addition, by utilizing real effort tasks with
real-time relative performance feedback and allowing for sabotage, I can examine the effect with
increased ecological validity. Furthermore, although competition-induced sabotage has been
shown to be a problem under a tournament incentive scheme when allowed, as of yet no solution
has been proposed which can reduce this potential shortcoming of tournament incentives. In
addition, by directly measuring the participants normative and empirical expectations, I also
hope to extend prior literature by further exploring the underlying mechanisms that manage
Bicchieri’s model of social norm activation, which models social norms in a way that can be
readily incorporated within traditional agency theory while utilizing current research in social
norms from the behavioral literature.
This study also has potential implications for practice. The results of this study suggest that
if companies truly want to activate a social norm that would assuage negative behavior, like
sabotage, that they should not simply adopt a code of ethics for regulatory compliance. They
should, instead, implement a system in which ground level employees certify the code of ethics
that discourages such behavior.
Further studies could explore how to combat acts of covert sabotage which, according to
Biccheri’s Model, would be particularly equipped to evade social norms activated by a code of
ethics because these acts would be unobservable. In addition, because I suspect the findings of this
study would not generalize to sabotage directed at employers, further research could also explore
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the effectiveness this and other remedies of stopping sabotage directed at the employer’s company
rather than his coworkers. Also, subsequent studies could also explore the cause and cures for
workplace discouragement that was evident in this study.
I hope to provide management with insight into how to practically design and implement
an incentive system. Special care may be needed to protect team members from those who’s
personality classifies them as inherently resistant to social norms, such as a those who may
border on schizoid personality disorder (Triebwasser et al. 2012). However, it’s very possible
that by having employees certify a code of ethics while competing in a tournament might be a
way for management to get the “best of both worlds”.
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Appendix A
I. The Sales Agency’s Responsibilities to the Manufacturer/Principal:







To comply with the Principal’s terms and conditions of sale.
To conscientiously cover the assigned territory, accounts or industry segment.
To avoid any form of misrepresentation.
To establish relationships only with those Principals which will be well represented by
the Sales Agency.
To refrain from representing competing lines without written agreement of the Principal.
To constantly strive to add value to the relationship between the Principal and the
Customers.

II. The Manufacturer’s/Principal’s Responsibilities to the Sales Agency:






To enter into a fair, clearly worded, written Sales Representative (Independent
Contractor) Agreement which addresses the needs, concerns, expectations and objectives
of both parties.
To refrain from modifying the terms of this agreement, except by mutual written consent
following full discussion of the matter.
To recognize the Sales Agency as an important element in the sales goals of the Principal.
To constantly strive to support the Sales Agency’s efforts by timely responses and open
communication.

III. The Sales Agency’s Responsibilities to the Customer:





To promote only those products or services which are in the Customer’s best interest.
To constantly strive to improve the relationship between the Principal and the Customer.
To clearly and fairly communicate the needs of all parties in the business relationship.
To process Customer problems and questions promptly and accurately.

VI. The Responsibilities of one Sales Agency to Another:





To share ideas beneficial to the rep profession.
To respect existing Principal relationships of other Sales Agencies.
To refrain from using unfair methods to solicit the Customers of another Sales Agency.
To cooperate to enhance the professional relationship of the Sales Agency and its
Principals by supporting MANA, which was established for that purpose; subscribing to
its aims and objectives, and in every practical way working to advance the marketing
interests of all Sales Agencies and their Principals.
https://www.manaonline.org/about/code-of-ethics/
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Appendix B: Excerpt from Sabotage Coding Instructions
How to Record Sabotage
Think of the video you are about to watch as taking place on a 12 x 12 square meter canvas (see
below). There are four avatars on the canvas, each with a 1 x 1 meter colored ink stamp. Each
avatar can jump to a blank spot on the canvas and color that spot their unique color. Each avatar
may jump anywhere from ~0.3 to ~1.3 meters. Your job is to record the amount canvas that is
painted by each avatar that has already been colored by another avatar.
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Appendix B (continued): Excerpt from Sabotage Coding Instructions
If an avatar paints over an area of the canvas that has previously been colored by another avatar,
the amount painted is to be recorded as Sabotage. The amount of color that is now gone because
it has been painted over by a new color is to be recorded as Loss. Please use a chart like the one
below to keep track of which avatars have sabotaged whom.

For example, in the picture below, the pink avatar (Yoshi) has sabotage a 1x1 meter square area
that was previously painted by the yellow avatar (DK).

In this case, you would fill in the chart as one square of sabotage for Yoshi and one square of
loss for DK.

You will most likely need to re-watch the videos and focus on only one avatar at a time in order
to get an accurate measurement. Please code your final recording as a % of the canvas (using the
conversion chart above) rounded to the nearest percentage point.
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